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1. TOCQUEVILLE IN AMERICA AND THE NEO-TOCQUEVILLIANS’ 
REVIVALISM
“What are the reasons for Tocqueville’s eternal youth?” This is the question Raymond Boudon asks in his recent book, Tocqueville for Today (Boudon 2006: 2). In other 
words, why do we keep reading Democracy in America, a book written 
in the 1830s, in order to understand how liberal democracy works today, 
both in the US and elsewhere? Boudon’s answer — that Tocqueville 
gave us a new and innovative sociological analysis that has yet to be 
surpassed — points to the exceptional character of his contribution to 
the understanding of modern societies. Alongside the names of Weber 
and Durkheim, Boudon doubtless includes Tocqueville as one of his most 
admired classic social thinkers. Curiously enough, Boudon’s assessment 
of Tocqueville as a sociological classic was itself an exceptional judgment 
only a generation ago. 
It was through Raymond Aron’s seminal re-examination of 
Tocqueville’s work in the 1950s and 1960s that the author of Democracy 
in America and The Ancient Regime and the Revolution was redefined as 
one of sociology’s “founding fathers”. Taken in the context of the Cold 
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War, it is fairly easy to see why: Tocqueville gave us an alternative to 
Marxist sociology. In his political writings, Tocqueville had argued that 
all increasingly egalitarian modern societies were confronted with the 
choice of becoming either “free” or “despotic”, by which he meant either 
horizontally organized by means of a plurality of voluntary organizations 
or vertically structured in a hierarchical fashion. 
This basic choice seemed to reflect the nature of the challenge 
faced by post-war societies much better than the idea of “class struggle” 
as proposed by Marx, and the interpretation helped put Tocqueville’s 
name in the sociological canon. But with notable exceptions like those 
of Boudon in France and Robert Bellah in the US (Bellah et al. 1985) 
and apart from the specific fields of historical and value sociology, soci-
ology did not make much use of the Montesquieu–Tocqueville tradition 
until well into the 1980s. Dominated by functionalist and structur-
alist analysis, sociology had some difficulties incorporating a tradi-
tion that emphasizes the ability of the homo sociologicus to act more 
individualistically.
The spectacular revival of Tocqueville in the 1990s took place first 
not in sociology but in political science. Furthermore, when it eventu-
ally reached the sociological field later in that decade, those who took 
the lead were those who had always shown limited enthusiasm with the 
Marxist sociological orientation (e.g. Alexander 1998, 2006). But it was 
Robert S. Putnam, the political scientist from Harvard, who contributed 
most substantially to make Tocqueville the “theorist of the decade”, first 
with the 1993 Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy and two years later with the best-seller Bowling Alone.
Interest in Tocqueville was raised further by other factors: the post 
1989 serious questioning of what is democracy, esp. in East Europe, 
China, and Latin America — and seeing Marxist answers as inad-
equate. The end of military dictatorships in Latin Am; global spread 
of democratic norms via mass media and internet. The continual rise 
of individualism; the pressing for ever more egalitarian redefinitions of 
democracy in Third World countries, such as the taking of power by the 
Untouchable Caste in India. The great policy stress on NGOs as critical 
to building democracy East Europe, Asia, and globally, led by best-sell-
ing books by George Soros and Francis Fukuyama. Suddenly, “neo-
Tocquevillian” became a popular label amongst political scientists and 
political sociologists. It conveyed a theoretical re-appreciation of the role 
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of civil society in the making and maintenance of democratic regimes. In 
particular, Putnam made use of the notion of “social capital” (originally 
theorized by James Coleman: see Coleman 1988) to call attention to the 
indirect psychological effects of associational membership. As Putnam’s 
thesis goes, those who in the 1950s joined professional bowling leagues 
were unconsciously reinforcing their civic virtues: participation in this 
sort of voluntary associations led to a decrease in individualism, which 
had the unintended yet democratically worthy consequence of reinforc-
ing political participation. 
Since the 1960s, however, Putnam notices that more and more 
Americans began to “bowl alone”. He uses this metaphor to illustrate 
the empirical claim that the once thriving American civic life is facing a 
dangerous decline: as associational membership diminishes, the demo-
cratic virtues it used to nourish also decline. Putnam equates the revival 
of interest in Tocqueville to a pledge for the revival of a lost golden age 
of associational life, the so-called Tocqueville–Putnam model of politi-
cal participation.
In our view, there are good reasons to reject this lament on theoreti-
cal grounds. First, this sort of revivalist tone is strange to Tocqueville’s 
work. Instead of orienting their analysis by reference to an idealized past, 
neo-Tocquevillians would do better if instead they would try to identify 
the causal mechanisms that allow one to transcend the mere narrative of 
historical singularities to the scientific explanation of social and political 
events. After all, it was Tocqueville who remarked, with a fair share of 
provocation, in favor of “talk[ing] about history but do not recount it” 
(2004 [1850–1858]: 467). 
Second, revivalism is in itself a questionable strategy, as both the 
functions and trajectory of civic organizations and groups always depend 
upon the cultural and ideological context. The problem with revivalism is 
that it arbitrarily compares the present with a certain period in the past. 
If one takes a different perspective — a long term analysis, a systematic 
cross-national comparison, or some other historical period as a term of 
reference — revivalism soon reveals its limitations. It is thus crucial to 
understand the present context if one wishes to contribute to the under-
standing of the current political situation, including both an analysis of 
the values and of the practices of citizens around the globe. 
In order to do so, we choose to study the last few decades in a cross-
national perspective.1 Contrary to Putnam, we do not assess the present 
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in terms of some lost glorified past, but in its own terms. Through the 
Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) project, we have been 
monitoring the development of the New Political Culture in cities in the 
US and abroad since the mid-1970s (e.g. Clark 1981). This international 
project, the largest in the world on local level politics and value change, 
has allowed us to see how and where older class political models have 
been replaced by NPC ones: over 50 books have been published in the 
course of over three decades of international cooperation by teams from 
over 30 countries. What we have been finding out is a global tendency 
for the emergence of a new normative cluster of values and practices 
(see figure 1).
This new style of politics — we call it New Political Culture (NPC) 
— is the corollary of the cumulative combination of many previous 
Figure 1: Factors driving toward the new political culture
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social changes, some of them mutually contradictory in terms of the 
traditional class political model: e.g. the last decades have seen moves 
1) toward social liberalism (captured in the Postmaterialist index and 
other items), and 2) toward fiscal conservatism. This is a critical issue 
that the New Political Culture analysis has been illuminating since the 
1970s. What drives the shift toward the NPC? Terry Clark and Ronald 
Inglehart identify 22 specific propositions, which fall under three gen-
eral ideas: hierarchy, empowerment and structural conditions (Clark 
and Hoffmann-Martinot 1998: 36ff.). Clark and Inglehart suggest seven 
general elements that help distinguish this NPC from traditional class 
politics: 1) the classic left–right dimension has been transformed; 2) 
social and fiscal/economic issues are explicitly distinguished; 3) social 
issues have risen in salience relative to fiscal/economic issues; 4) market 
individualism and social individualism grow; 5) questioning the welfare 
state (national governments seem to be loosing much of their legitimacy 
as federalism and regionalism claim new converts); 6) the rise of issue 
politics and broader citizen participation, alongside the decline of hier-
archical political organizations; 7) these NPC views are more pervasive 
among younger, more educated and affluent individuals, and societies 
(Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot 1998: 10–13). 
In addition, there has been a significant rise in salience of culture 
and the arts in the past few decades, the political significance of which is 
yet to be properly explored. We address this by first reviewing the theory 
of the New Political Culture and then adapting it to consumption, arts 
and culture via the new concept of “scene”. 
As we will show, if one takes a global view on these general changes 
in political culture and combines them with detailed local analyses of 
urban processes of change, a compelling case emerges for one to dis-
card the orthodox Tocqueville–Putnam model of political participation 
through formal associations. Our proposed alternative points to new 
forms of participation, leadership and legitimacy that are not only more 
globally widespread than the New England Tocqueville–Putnam political 
model, but are also much more in tune with the emergent patterns of 
political culture in the past few decades. From this perspective, Putnam’s 
lament looses much of its appeal. Our contention is that Putnam’s claim 
of a generalized civic decline since the 1960s in the US is not only theo-
retically unconvincing, given its questionable revivalist tone, but it is 
also empirically flawed. This is even more so outside the US, even in the 
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international book he edited, if one reads the chapters closely (Putnam 
2002). Other forms of political participation have emerged and devel-
oped in this period, signalling the limitations of the Tocqueville–Putnam 
model of participation.
2. NPC MEANS BROADER POLITICAL REPERTOIRES
The revivalism of neo-Tocquevillians like Putnam is based upon the claim 
that political participation has declined since the 1960s as an unintended 
consequence of a number of socio-economic developments. In what fol-
lows, we show that this claim does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. 
On the contrary, we suggest the opposite may actually be true. There has 
not been a decline but an increase in political participation in the last 
half a century. Such an increase is associated with the expansion of the 
repertoire of political action, a development that is very much “off the 
radar screen” of Putnam’s model. What has been happening since the 
1960s in the US is nothing less but a shift in the very norms of citizen-
ship: what constitutes political participation, what is generally considered 
to be the duties of a “good citizen”, has dramatically changed since the 
Eisenhower years. 
In brief, one can describe the prevalent conception of citizenship 
in the mid-twentieth century as duty-based. Citizens’ duties included 
electoral participation, payment of taxes, and availability to serve in the 
military. In turn, citizens expected to have their civil, political, and certain 
economic and social rights protected. Almond and Verba’s 1963 classic 
The Civic Culture is perhaps the best description of the political culture 
in which this conception of citizenship originated and developed. They 
suggest a “threefold classification of participant, subject, and parochial” 
political cultures, where the highest degree possible of civicness corre-
sponds to someone who devotedly performs his citizenship duties. Such a 
classification is itself exemplary of the mode of thinking associated with 
this duty-based idea of citizenship (Almond and Verba 1965 [1963]: 19). 
Likewise, Putnam describes the generation that experienced World War 
II and its aftermath as a “long civic generation”, due to its exceptional 
willingness to work for a political party and vote, to write letters to pub-
lic officials, or attend political rallies (Putnam 2003: 45). The inculcation 
of citizenship duties functional to the political system was an elemental 
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aspect of the political socialization experience in this period. In short, this 
was a generation for whom the exercise of citizenship was closely related 
to norms of social order. The style of politics in mid-twentieth century 
Europe and North America still had strong elements of “class politics” 
and clientelism: left and right were clearly opposed to one another as 
hierarchical relations between the citizenry and their representatives pre-
dominated. The public questioning of racism, sexism, and homophobia, 
as well as the assertion of individual rights of self-expression, had to wait 
for the next generation to take place. 
Indeed, all this began to change in the 1960s. The shift in citizenship 
norms from a class politics paradigm to the NPC is revealed as soon as 
one considers that the older debates about capitalism vs. socialism, and 
left vs. right, have gradually been complemented, if not replaced entirely, 
by new, issue-specific concerns, like feminism and environmental protec-
tion, among others. In contrast to the hierarchy and tradition of the past, 
individualism and egalitarianism exists more pervasively today. A new 
focus on the citizen, on neighborhoods, on individual participation and 
self-generated bottom-up rather than top-down politics has also become 
apparent. A new generation of political leaders, leaders who break old 
rules and break free from ideological categories, has gradually developed 
a new style of politics. 
Consider the French case. If the General Charles de Gaulle was 
illustrative of the older class-politics style, Nicholas Sarkozy and his 
celebrity wife Carla Bruni are the consummate personification of NPC 
values. The shift from class politics and clientelism to NPC is also illus-
trated by individualizing lifestyles, exemplified in dress, entertainment, 
spontaneity, and volatility of choice. This same individualism — which 
can be expressed politically — is also expressed daily in people’s lives, in 
how they choose clothes, or where to spend their free time. 
This tendency extends the individualism to many new domains: in 
contrast to tourists travelling in a large group to a classic, fixed destina-
tion, or travelling to the same vacation home with your family. Instead 
young persons increasingly find, or search for, more personalized life-
styles. Music provides yet another excellent illustration of this societal 
shift in norms and values. One could perhaps regret the fact that classical 
music is no longer taught to every middle-class child, as seemed more 
common in the upper middle class world of the 1950s. We suggest alter-
natively that one should try to understand the political implications of 
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classical music’s new, broader scope. To wit: classical music finds itself 
in more venues than ever before, in concert halls, at festivals, on iPods, 
examined and re-examined daily through myriad niche interests by mil-
lions of people, and we would be remiss to overlook the significance of 
this broader influence of classical music in revivalist grieving over a lost 
golden age (Kimmelman 2008: 40). 
Underlying this normative shift is the assumption that there are mul-
tiple components to citizenship. Traditional components include norms 
of law-abidingness, solidarity, criticism, and deliberation. NPC citizen-
ship norms adds others that are more self-expressive and individualistic: 
political consumerism is one good illustration of this. If class politics was 
associated with a duty-based notion of citizenship, NPC comes associ-
ated with a more egalitarian, individualistic and expressive conception of 
what it means to be a citizen. These two basic components of citizenship 
currently coexist, especially in North America and West Europe (see table 
1). Among different groups, however, their importance varies. Younger 
people tend to exhibit a stronger positive correlation to NPC citizenship 
norms (such as forming one’s own opinion) whereas older people are 
more often supportive of ideas like obeying the law (a classic civic duty). 
Table 1: Citizenship norms
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The younger and more educated you are, the more likely you are to be 
dissatisfied with hierarchical, institutionalized forms of participation. 
The relationship between values and practices is a particularly com-
plex one. More work is needed to flesh out the exact causal mechanisms 
operating in this interface. Still, citizenship norms seem to correspond 
to certain political practices. For instance, it is more likely for someone 
holding socially liberal views on abortion and gay rights to boycott 
products for ethical reasons than those who do not. Conversely, some-
one for whom participation is a civic duty is more likely to vote. Note 
that both citizenship norms might promote political participation, only 
of a different kind. People closer to a NPC framework are more likely 
to participate in more expressive, individualistic, and non-institutional-
ized ways, given their dissatisfaction with the formal options of political 
participation. In turn, those who exhibit a more conventional concep-
tion of citizenship will certainly be more inclined to participate through 
institutionalized channels. Contrary to the conventional view that favors 
more institutionalized forms of participation (as if these were, from the 
standpoint of democracy, superior to informal ones), our contention is 
that they are complementary. To vote is certainly the most efficient way 
for a group of citizens to choose their representatives in a democratic 
fashion. Expressing one’s views in an internet forum, however, can be 
equally important for the maintenance of democracy as a way of life. 
Moreover, as we will later show, the variety of political repertoires is 
larger than most political analysts are usually willing to accept. Once 
we confront the Calvinist civic tradition (strong in New England, the 
Netherlands, Scotland, and Switzerland for centuries, but now spread-
ing globally) with other political cultures, we soon realize that glamour, 
irony, and entertainment can be alternative and powerful sources of 
political legitimacy. 
In sum, at the same time as election turnout has been declining, 
people are engaging in other ways including working with informal 
groups in their communities, joining contentious activities, becoming 
internet activists and political consumers. In short, there was no decline 
in political participation in the past four decades in the US, but rather 
we experienced an extraordinary expansion of the repertoire of politi-
cal action. People nowadays still vote and join political parties, but they 
do so in different ways (less deferential, more egalitarian: the democrat 
campaign for the 2008 Presidential election of Barack Obama, with its 
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massive voluntary door-to-door mobilization, provides a good illustra-
tion of this tendency); more importantly, they also join internet groups 
and boycott products for ethical and political reasons, both expressions 
of their more self-conscious individuality. But, one might ask, are peo-
ple today participating more or less than fifty years ago, considering all 
forms of political activity? This is the question we try to answer next, 
again drawing on the findings of the FAUI project.
3. SHIFTING NORMS, INCREASING ENGAGEMENT 
Based upon our previous work, we expect a decline (or, at best, a 
maintenance) of more institutionalized forms of political participation 
to be accompanied by an increase of the more individualized forms of 
participation associated with the NPC. This would be consonant with 
our main thesis that a new constellation of values and norms has been 
steadily establishing itself since the 1970s. As generations succeed one 
another, the prevalence of a class politics citizenship gives way to a more 
pluralist polity (Keane 1988) in which NPC citizenship (norms and 
practices) grows in salience. In table 4, we compare voting turnout and 
participation in electoral campaigns as institutionalized forms of political 
participation with more expressive forms such as participating in protest 
activities or in issue-oriented civic groups. By comparing the evolution of 
the two styles of politics in the US from the 1950s until the present we 
wish to put the Tocqueville–Putnam model and its associated jeremiad 
for the loss of a golden civic age to the test. 
As we see below, the case for a general decline in civic participa-
tion lacks empirical support. The trends in political participation show a 
decline in electoral participation and political campaigns and a rise in all 
other forms of participation. The political engagement of the American 
public seems not to have declined in absolute terms but rather, given the 
enlargement of political repertoires, become more diverse. The norma-
tive pattern of what constitutes participation and citizenship has dra-
matically shifted since the 1960s. Internet activism, for instance, is less 
than ten years old and growing exponentially. The alleged decline has 
been in the traditional “class politics” paradigm of the 1950s, the model 
that Putnam takes for a civic golden era. People may not be participat-
ing as before in the professional bowling leagues he elects as “civically 
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beneficial”, but not for the reasons he suggests (civic anomie). The very 
foundations of democracy and citizenship have been changing in the 
US and abroad in the last few decades towards a more socially liberal, 
fiscally conservative political culture. With it, new trends of political 
participation have emerged, along with a more differentiated pattern of 
political participation. Individualistic and expressive forms of political 
participation are growing significantly, whereas traditional forms like 
voting are either stable or in decline.
There are, of course, forms of participation that, despite not being 
explicitly political in their nature and aims, perform nonetheless political 
functions. Tocqueville was among the first to call attention to the fact 
that membership in non-political voluntary organizations, from church 
groups to music associations, could have the unintended positive effect 
of stimulating democratic virtues. This classic insight has inspired a great 
deal of research on participation and civil society, including the recent 
revivalist neo-Tocquevillian strand led by Putnam. In what follows, we 
explore a largely ignored form of non-political participation that is not 
only changing the way we do politics today but it is also transforming 
how we conceive of citizenship — we refer to cultural participation.
Table 3: Types of Political Participation — US
Voting: VEP Highest Office Turnout from http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.
htm; Signing a Petition, Joining in Boycotts and Attending lawful demonstrations 
from WVS.











1981 1989 1994 1999
signed petition boycott lawful demonstrations vote
Source: Voting: VEP Highest Office Turnout from http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm; Signing a
Petition, Joining in Boycotts and Attending lawful demonstrations from WVS.
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4. CULTURAL PARTICIPATION AS A “PUBLIC GOOD”
The rise of cultural issues is a critical, specific aspect of the NPC. 
As NPC develops, classic concerns of work and job decline, ceding 
their importance to a new creativity, a playfulness, an entrepreneur-
ship that has come to define the ideal workplace. “Ideal” organizations 
like Microsoft or Google are detailed as having “campus-like creative 
settings”. They are the new models in business magazines like Fortune 
and Business Week. Work and leisure are no longer so isolated; leisure 
concerns penetrate the workplace. This recent yet widespread tendency 
of dedifferentiation directly questions the classic modernization theory’s 
thesis that functional differentiation is the dominant principle of societal 
organization. Driven by more income, education, and the NPC, culture 
and tourism are key parts of this transformation. Art is on the walls of 
many banks; major corporations sponsor theatre, music, and public art. 
Political leaders sense the importance of rising arts and culture concerns 
among citizens and look for ways to capture these concerns: via public 
art, music festivals, historic preservation of neighborhoods, museums, 
and more. Essen Germany, Naples Italy, Bogotá Colombia, and Chicago 
USA are all heavy industrial cities that have dramatically transformed 
themselves via creative mayors and arts and culture-based policies in 
the last decade or two. We cite these precisely as they were rapid but 
deep transformations by strong political leaders, not just continuation 
of a long tradition, as one finds in a Paris or Beijing. We see more book-
stores, internet sites, coffee shops, and all forms of cultural activities in 
these cities and all over the world. Participants in our FAUI project have 
documented deep change in these and many other locations.
More generally, this rise of consumption, lifestyle, amenities, and 
culture is captured in emerging new theories of “post industrial society” 
that contrast with more traditional workplace theories of which Marxism 
is the most extreme. Classic individualism in its pure market form, in the 
tradition of Locke, Hobbes, and Adam Smith, contrasts sharply in the 
themes of newer theorizing. Max Weber stressed that deeper aesthetic 
issues could be distinctly more personal and individualistic than many 
other political activities (1968: 607–610). Our last book illustrating this 
transformation and extension of the New Political Culture is The City 
as an Entertainment Machine (Clark 2003), whose title stresses the new 
importance of entertainment, consumption and culture for cities. It lays 
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Table 4: Rising membership of cultural activity groups
Country 1981 1990 2000 Delta
Netherlands 12.5 34.6 45.2 32.7
USA 13.9 19.7 36.9 23.0
Sweden 13.0 12.7 26.7 13.7
Finland 3.1 20.1 14.6 11.5
Canada 9.7 17.7 20.1 10.4
Denmark 6.2 12.5 16.6 10.4
Belgium 10.3 16.2 18.9 8.6
Iceland 7.6 13.8 15.5 7.9
Estonia 11.1 7.9 7.9
South Korea 3.2 11.0 7.8
Japan 3.8 6.0 11.0 7.2
Norway 6.6 13.5 6.9
Italy 3.9 4.9 9.9 6.0
West Germany 6.1 12.0 5.9
South Africa 8.2 13.5 5.3
Britain 6.1 9.3 10.4 4.3
Ireland 6.7 10.1 10.9 4.2
Argentina 5.3 5.9 9.0 3.7
Mexico 6.5 11.5 9.5 3.0
France 5.6 8.8 8.1 2.5
Spain 4.9 5.3 6.6 1.7
Northern Ireland 6.1 10.9 7.6 1.5
Hungary 2.5 3.6 1.1
Romania 1.6 2.6 1.0
Austria 13.0 8.0 13.2 0.2
Chile 9.3 9.3 0
Bulgaria 4.3 4.0 –0.3
Portugal 6.2 3.7 –2.5
Brazil 5.4 2.4 –3.0
Latvia 6.8 3.7 –3.1
Russia 4.9 1.2 –3.7
Lithuania 7.3 2.9 –4.4
China 7.3 2.2 –5.1
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out an analytical perspective stressing the importance of amenities as 
attracting persons to locations that have the most powerful amenities 
(schools, low crime, clean air, friends and family, restaurants, cultural 
facilities).
We first ask whether membership in cultural organizations has been 
rising and, if so, what are its political implications. Table 5 shows the 
results for the period 1981–2000 using the World Values Survey.
The conclusion: for most countries, including the US, the picture 
that emerges is that cultural group membership is rising indeed. Note 
however that this does not seem to be the case in post-communist coun-
tries. Since in the literature much attention is given to generational differ-
ences in values, behaviour and what else more, in Figure 1 we analyzed 
how generations differ in the membership of cultural activity groups.
Figure 2: Generations and memberships to cultural activity groups. (F 
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The above of course leads to the conclusion that Verba and Nie 
(1972) and Putnam are mistaken on one thing: Culture is on the rise 
without any doubt. This validates Inglehart’s claim (1977, 2003) that 
culture will continue to be an important part of civic life. An impor-
tant note, however, is that while it may be true that culture is on the 
rise, this does not imply that Inglehart’s diagnoses as to its causes and 
mechanisms are correct. This rise of culture is much more nuanced and 
context-dependent than his model suggests.
The existing literature on associational membership has shown that 
members of civic organizations tend to score significantly higher than 
non-members in most if not all indicators of political participation, from 
contacting a public official to be politically engaged or to trust in public 
institutions (e.g. Stolle and Rochon 1998). What has been less studied is 
the impact of different types of associations upon political participation 
(an exception is Bowler, Donovan, and Hanneman 2003). Our work on 
cultural participation addresses this gap in the literature. We wish to 
make two distinct claims. 
First, we argue that participation in cultural organizations and 
events belongs to the broader political repertoire typical of NPC citizen-
ship, which includes many activities of protest and self-expression. To 
express yourself through music, fashion, and cultural practices is, we 
believe, an extension of your autonomy as a critical, engaged citizen. 
Second, cultural participation has significant impact as a “pub-
lic good”. Our claim is that when focus rests exclusively on “public 
interest organizations” (e.g. environmental or consumer groups), we 
loose sight of other types of organizations that provide public goods. 
Cultural organizations are paramount in this regard. Following this 
claim of culture as a public good, we expect different types of asso-
ciation to have different political impacts with cultural associations 
exhibiting higher than average scores. Table 5, drawing on cases from 
the US, Germany and Sweden, provides some evidence supporting this 
hypothesis. 
As we see above, cultural participation is on the rise and its political 
implications are far-reaching. Those who spend time in going to music 
festivals, art galleries, or conceive of the way they dress as part of their 
“do-it-yourself biography” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995), are also 
those who join more often NPC-based forms of political participation. 
To understand the dynamics of this general rise in salience of culture, 
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our models need to conciliate cross-national analysis with detailed local 
studies. In other words, context matters, both at the level of countries 
and at the level of cities and neighborhoods. In fact, it is at the local level 
that the societal shift from class politics and clientelism is best captured 
and its nature properly understood. The FAUI data shows that the rise 
of NPC is far from being a linear process of diffusion of values. This 
process sometimes has been messy, it is usually complex, and is always 
very sensitive to local dynamics. In the next section, we submit the 
Tocqueville–Putnam model to a systematic cross-national comparison. 
This will be then followed by a contemporary re-edition of Tocqueville’s 
classic comparison between France and the US, in which we make use 
of our concept of “scene” to enlighten the local dynamics of cultural 
participation.
5. BEYOND THE TOWN MEETING CIVIC TRADITION
An alternative to the Tocqueville-Putnam tradition is a more sensitive 
cultural palette that might help us repaint some of the traditional (New 
England-inspired) institutions to make them more tractable to persons 
who find their intricacies off-putting. Additionally, altogether different 
institutions may be crafted or ridden to capture the energies of persons 
whose cultural backgrounds are closer to the matador than the civics 
teacher. One source of inspiration one can draw upon is concrete, suc-
cessful cases of new modes of securing political legitimacy other than 
voting or citizen participation. 
Bogotá, Naples, and Chicago are among the many sources of a new 
style of leadership and citizenship, new modes for engaging citizens that 
often are in conflict with the Tocqueville–Putnam tradition. Rather than 
focusing on the Kiwanis Club or the League of Women Voters, mayors in 
Naples, Chicago, and especially Bogotá have developed highly popular, 
symbolic leadership, joined in specific actions, as alternative modes of 
governance that work (instead of the classic civic group). These alterna-
tive modes of urban governance work in part since they are founded on 
a base of distrust, alienation, and cynicism that makes the Tocqueville 
model distinctly more difficult to construct. In the last few years, we 
have collaborated with several Latin Americans, Italians, and Spaniards 
to document and generalize the lessons from Bogota, Naples and even 
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Chicago in a manner that they might be applicable to situations such as 
the civic vacuum found in Mexico City as well as some LA (and Chicago) 
neighborhoods.2 
Consider the following examples of non-traditional policies that 
worked. These come from our Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation 
Project, which for over 20 years has identified creative policy innova-
tions and helped bring them to other locations. Naples had hundreds of 
shrines and small parks that were closed for decades. A new administra-
tion engaged local groups to mobilize citizens and classroom students to 
reclaim the small shrines and parks and keep them open, in an explicit 
effort to broaden civic engagement, starting from neighborhood ameni-
ties. Crime is salient everywhere. Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy 
(CAPS) created regular meetings of police and local neighbors to review 
strategies and collaborate on improving safety. Crime has dropped sub-
stantially. Chicago has created Tax Increment Financing (TIFF) districts 
that sponsor neighborhood development initiatives. They obtain funding 
from property value growth in the neighborhood area. Funds are used 
to improve the district, thereby channeling funds that are not reviewed 
in the normal ways by the City government. 
These examples seem to suggest that democracy does not require 
voting and citizen participation, i.e. political legitimacy can be attained 
through channels other than those suggested by the Tocqueville-Putnam 
model. Take yet another example, now of Colombia’s capital, Bogotá. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Bogotá was known mostly for being the 
murder capital of the world, one of the most violent cities in the world, 
with a peak rate of approximately 80 homicides per 100.000 inhabit-
ants in 1993. Bogotá was a clear reflection of Colombia’s critical situ-
ation of continuing civil war, drug-related crime and rampant political 
corruption. But in 1995, after an unusual political campaign, the former 
university professor of mathematics and philosophy, Antanas Mockus, 
was elected mayor. This highly charismatic mayor introduced a new 
style of political leadership that contradicted most of the assumptions 
of Putnam’s New England “town meeting” participation model. Yet his 
“Civic Culture Program” was a resounding success, creatively empow-
ering citizens to solve many of the common problems that affect urban 
life. In fact, what Mockus did was to turn Putnam’s Tocquevillian logic 
on its head. Instead of conceiving of “good government” as the product 
of “civicness”, Mockus’s innovative “Civic Culture Program” demon-
PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES
| 266 |
strated that civicness could actually be a product of good government. 
Bogotá’s administration under Mockus made extensive use of every sort 
of pedagogical device, communication strategy, and symbolic language 
to engage citizens in the transformation of the everyday use of urban 
contexts. 
The lesson to draw from Bogotá, Naples and Chicago, is that new 
problems require new solutions. Old forms of political legitimacy have 
been undermined: citizens, especially in locations with weak traditions 
of citizen participatory democracy are nowadays more alienated, indi-
Figure 3: Mayor Mockus as “Super Citizen”
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vidualistic and sophisticated than they have been in the past. Mayors 
in such locations are thus often considering other means than the ones 
prescribed by the Tocqueville-Putnam tradition to achieve their ends. 
Some, like Mockus in early 21st century in Bogotá, took recourse to a 
mixture of charismatic legitimacy and self-expressively individualistic 
legitimacy to attain his political goals, and met with considerable success. 
Though traditionalistic, egalitarian and utilitarian-particularistic forms 
of legitimacy might still retain some of their appeal, there is a growing 
demand for more individualistic, charismatic, and creative forms of 
legitimacy. Innovations — exceptions to the Tocqueville-Putnam model 
— abound. We need to look further across the world, and incorporate 
more diverse approaches to enrich our understanding of democratic 
options and patterns.
Some core ideas from the above discussion can now be joined to 
controversial and competing findings about social capital and organiza-
tions. Tocqueville and Putnam’s theory draws on cases like Massachusetts 
town meetings and Northern Italian City States, where more participa-
tion of citizens seems to have increased their trust, and feelings of sup-
port and legitimacy about the political system. We term this Model 1. 
There are thousands of studies that explore this pattern, but we cite just 
a few distinctive results that help contextualize it. One is Angelika Vetter 
(2007) who studied citizen participation using ISSP, WVS, and similar 
data, linking in a theoretically distinctive way the national and the local. 
She found that citizens who participated more in local organizational 
activities felt substantially more legitimacy for the national political 
system. This held strong in many of the West European countries and 
the US. So, participation leads to more trust and legitimacy, local and 
national in these results.
A second set of studies focuses on areas like Latin America (e.g. 
Sudarsky 2002 and Moreno 2001) and show that civic participation and 
trust and legitimacy are low in most Latin American countries. This has 
led many following the Tocqueville-Putnam tradition to search for ways 
to increase participation, hoping it will engage citizens more broadly, 
reduce violence, and contribute to public and civic wellbeing. We could 
call this Model 2. But it is simply the obverse of Model 1 and does not 
per se question the causal dynamics of Tocqueville and Putnam.
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Models 1 and 2
N W Europe High on both variables
Latin Am Low on both
Model 3, maybe 4?
Asian cases low on civic 
participation but high on trust. 
Yet they may vary on causes of trust
Model 4
Negative impact
But if we shift to certain Asian countries, the quasi-determinism of 
Models 1 and 2 is called into question. Model 3 is thus posited, where 
a positive relation between non-civic variables may substitute for the 
civic participation so stressed in Model 1. That is, civic participation in 
Japan is low. By some measures, it is even in the range of Latin America. 
However, contradicting Models 1 and 2, in Japan trust and legitimacy 
are roughly similar to Western Europe and the US — as measured by 
standardized surveys such as the ISSP and WVS. Seymour M. Lipset, 
in American Exceptionalism (1996), discusses these sorts of results in 
detail in his last section and appendices with data on Japan; so does 
Francis Fukuyama in his book Trust (1995). However the highly detailed 
analysis by Kobayashi (2008) of Japan citizens questions the depth of 
this trust, and suggests it is often constrained by traditional leadership 
in rural localities, clientelist linkages for some citizens, strong party alle-
giance of others. He suggests that the widespread clientelist practices of 
the Liberal Democratic Party are undermining trust for many citizens, 
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larger cities which have generally elected mayors and governors that are 
not LDP party members. Kobayashi adds substantially more depth and 
subtlety by combining “rich citizen” and “leader”, national and local 
data, in overlapping analyses. He stresses within-country differences 
and change dynamics. Yet overall, he shows that many of the “normal” 
practices of North America and West Europe do not operate as widely 
assumed (e.g. Inoguchi 2002). Without seeking to detail how and why, 
we list some major factors that these and other studies of Japan have 
stressed: the intensity of the family, the social indebtedness which chil-
dren feel toward parents and authority figures, the tight social relations 
of work circles in large industries and class rooms for students, the cli-
entelist linkages to traditional leaders which these overlapping, intense 
social relations enhance and legitimate. In his book on Japanese culture, 
S.N. Eisenstadt details how despite continual efforts by foreigners and 
“modernization” or “reform” over the twentieth century, these patterns 
adapt and continue (Eisenstadt 1995).
The universality of Tocqueville (Model 1) is more deeply challenged 
by a provocative recent doctoral dissertation by Seokho Kim (2008) who 
investigates these patterns by comparing them across 38 countries using 
the ISSP national survey data for citizen participation, trust, and related 
items. He finds the expected patterns for much of Northwest Europe 
and the US: Model 1 holds, though it reveals some surprising exceptions 
(Table 6). The most dramatic results, however, are that in many countries 
outside Northwest Europe and the US, civic participation reduces trust 
and support for the political system, shown here at Model 4.
He details this pattern for South Korea. Kim’s core interpretation 
is that many Korean “civic groups” work following distinct rules: as cli-
entelist, particularistic civic groups (i.e., high school and college alumni 
associations) which are, by definition, closed to those who did not attend 
that school or college, and do not have a wide enough membership to 
generate trust and legitimacy across the full citizenry. In fact, they may 
do the opposite: where they are more active, they may close off access 
to political leadership by others, especially lower status citizens. This is 
closer to the prebendal form of exchange among leaders that Max Weber 
detailed, and which some clientelist studies suggest persists especially in 
poorer countries where public policies remain highly clientelist and elit-
ist; benefits do not trickle down to the broad general public of citizens 
as much as in other countries.3 
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The findings are distinctly provocative, as they distinguish Portugal 
from Spain, yet find that Brazil is closer to the Portuguese, not the 
Spanish pattern in Table 5. Spain joins the Northern European coun-
tries in illustrating the Model 1 pattern above. Portugal is the opposite, 
illustrating Model 4, with negative impacts of civic participation in both 
measures (civic virtue and trust), similar to other countries that are con-
sistently negative, like Austria and Poland. Are these Group IV countries 
more consistently clientelist and prebendal? We cannot tell without fur-
ther analysis, but the underling full regression tables for Spain, Portugal, 
Brazil, and the Netherlands are listed in the Appendix for inspection. 
These are summarized in Table 5. Note that Brazil is only negative on 
one of the two measures. 
Kim suggests clientelism, and we want to know how this might 
operate, or other processes might generate distrust. For more partici-
pation to generate less trust in a clientelist system, presumably it is the 
non-members who feel resentment and distrust from being excluded from 
clientelist organizations. It should be possible to look for direct evidence 
in a general citizen survey asking about membership (and non-member-
ship); would this resentment effect not be stronger among non-members? 
But this is not the Table 5 finding. If there is a clear negative effect of 
participation, as in Table 5, then some specific direct effects should be 
explored. 
Table 6: A List of ISSP Countries by Capacity of Voluntary 






US, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Japan, Latvia, Norway, Spain, 
Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela
Group II 




Bulgaria, Great Britain, Flanders, 
Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Taiwan
Group IV 
Korea, Austria, Brazil†, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal††, Russia, Slovenia
† Associational membership significantly and negatively affects social trust
†† Associational membership significantly and negatively affects civic virtue
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Which organizations encourage distrust among their members? 
Terrorist and all organizations proposing “conspiratorial” thinking imply 
that the “establishment” is not to be trusted. Alternatively, Richard 
Nixon and Slobodan Milosevic are not the only leaders to encourage 
distrust. Organizations worldwide that criticize and emphasize criti-
cism thus could encourage distrust. The mass organizations are unions, 
parties, and churches. In examining Group IV countries, one wonders 
about unions and radical parties in Austria, Brazil, Hungary, and Russia. 
Slovenians lived under the domain of Serbs like Milosevic for centuries. 
Some churches also promote distrust. The Roman Catholic Church fos-
tered distrust of the Communist leadership before 1989 in Poland. In 
the 2008 US Presidential Primary election, Barack Obama was criticized 
for attending a church whose minister blamed white American elites for 
having used bombs and creating resentment, which in turn led to the 
September 11, 2001 NYC bombing. 
The general point is that cultural content matters, and varies by 
context. Thus the Tocqueville of Model 1 is inevitably wrong for some 
organizations. Too many studies have only measured organizational 
membership and participation, while omitting organizational culture. 
This is an important, classic contribution of cross-national research, 
and anthropological fieldwork: it shows us our ethnocentrism. These 
dramatic results are definitely unexpected: that more civic participation 
brings less trust and civic virtue/legitimacy (Model 4 found in countries 
in Group IV in Table 5). Surely the first steps should be to explore these 
patterns with other models, other data (like the WVS). We should try 
various forms of sensitivity analysis, making small changes in models 
and measures and looking for changes in results. It would also be useful 
to review past studies using national data for countries like Portugal, 
Russia, Poland, to see if they contradict Kim’s dramatic results, or more 
generally, to try to explain where and why one can find elements of 
Models 1, 2, 3, or 4 in different contexts, across and within countries. 
Do they vary by urban-rural, by more/less clientelist contexts, do they 
shift by types of civic associations, for instance. Surely the rapid growth 
and spread of civic associations globally suggests that they vary hugely 
in their actual operating principals and consequences. Tocqueville should 
enjoy the challenge of globalizing his theory.
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6. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA REVISITED
As we have seen above, civic engagement and participation depend on 
the cultural and ideological context. According to the World Values 
Survey (1981, 1990), a sharp decline in political interest rates (presum-
ably formal, state politics) and rising abstention in France coexists with a 
widespread increase in all NPC citizenship activities (petitions, boycotts, 
demonstrations). France, in turn, has historically been a global leader in 
cultural amenities, which provides us with an excellent illustration of 
the recent rise in salience of culture documented above. Our goal, like 
Tocqueville’s, is to try to identify emerging trends in democratic politics. 
An important form of specification of “context” we have developed is 
the notion of “scene”, which tries to capture clusters of cultural ameni-
ties. This concept helps us to further specify the dynamics of the emerg-
ing political trends. 
Music, art, and theatre critics have long invoked “scenes,” but 
social scientists have barely addressed the concept (Blum 2003 began). 
In a recent paper, Silver, Clark and Rothfield (2006) suggest a “theory 
of scenes” as elements of urban/neighborhood life. Scenes have risen in 
salience as analysts recognize that jobs and distance explain less, and 
amenities and lifestyle are critical elements driving economic develop-
ment and migration. This theory of scenes is more than 1. neighborhood 
2. physical structures 3. persons labeled by race, class, gender, educa-
tion, etc. They include these but stress 4. the specific combinations of 
these and activities (like attending a concert) which join them. These 
four components are in turn defined by 5. the values people pursue in a 
scene. General values are legitimacy, defining a right or wrong way to 
live; theatricality, a way of seeing and being seen by others; and authen-
ticity, as a meaningful sense of identity. They add sub-dimensions, like 
egalitarianism, traditionalism, exhibitionism, localism, ethnicity, trans-
gression, corporateness, and more. All the dimensions combine in specific 
ideal-types of scenes like Disney Heaven, Baudelaire’s River Styx, and 
Bobo’s Paradise. 
Researchers have long recognized that the organization of life’s 
necessities into meaningful social formations (neighborhoods) and that 
the organization of labor into larger formations (firms, industrial dis-
tricts, classes) can produces significant consequences that go beyond the 
sum of these formations’ parts (Putnam, Marx, and many others). Our 
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proposal is that scenes organize consumption into a meaningful social 
activity and that these social formations can and must be studied in their 
own terms as modes of association. 
There are three broad dimensions of experience that define a con-
sumer out to ‘experience’ the world (rather than to reside in it or to 
make new products). We believe that being a consumer means being 
oriented toward 1) the pleasures of appearances, the way we display 
ourselves to others and see their images in turn. This we call theatrical-
ity. Determinate scenes give determinate meaning to the theatricality of 
consumers’ lives. Being a consumer also means 2) being oriented toward 
the pleasures of having an identity, who we are and what it means to 
be genuine and real rather than fake and phony. This we call authen-
ticity. Determinate scenes give determinate meaning to the authenticity 
of consumers’ lives. And finally, being a consumer means 3) orienting 
oneself toward the pleasures of holding moral beliefs and intentions, the 
authorities on which we take our judgments to be right or wrong. This 
we call legitimacy. Determinate scenes give determinate meaning to the 
legitimacy of consumers’ lives. 
This third dimension is directly related with our paper’s theme. Let 
us now see exactly how this is so. To enter into a space of shared con-
sumer activity is to open oneself up to a world of seeing and being seen 
as if acting a part, as if one were a work of art to be enjoyed and taken 
in. Scenes give specific meaning to this part of the consuming self through 
the ways they determine what counts as successful theatrical behavior. 
The activity of consuming, however, is not exhausted by its theatrical-
ity; scenes are more than human showcases. The activity of consuming 
is an intentional activity in which one makes decisions about what to 
consume, what to enjoy, what to appreciate. Intentions imply reasons; 
and reasons rest on authoritative standards of judgment. 
Legitimacy thus defines for consumers a goal (ethically right belief), 
an activity (submission/rejection of imperatives and prohibitions), and 
a set of substances to be worked on (the will, the intention to act). But 
these goals and activities can give determinate meanings to consumer 
life in different ways, and determinate scenes will provide different 
sorts of symbolic legitimation to the activity of consuming: legitimacy 
may be rooted in ancestral heritage and the wisdom of generations, in 
the exceptional personality of charismatic individuals, in the notion 
of equal respect for all, in the efficient and productive pursuit of indi-
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viduals’ material self-interest, in the expression of each person’s unique 
creative imagination. Specific scenes become the scenes they are in part 
by making this aspect of the consuming self determinately meaningful 
in these various ways. Because the goals, activities, and standards that 
legitimate consumption must always be determinately specified, we 
focus on five specifications, or, again, sub-dimensions, that allow us to 
recognize specific forms of scenes in terms of the specific ways in which 
they promote different senses of the legitimacy of the consumption: 
traditionalistic legitimacy, egalitarian legitimacy, charismatic legitimacy, 
utilitarian-individualistic legitimacy, and self-expressively individualistic 
legitimacy. 
These five types of legitimacy are certainly not exhaustive, but they 
do capture, the most common legitimation practices which groups of 
amenities help to cultivate. This list is an adaptation from the work of 
Max Weber, Robert Bellah, and Daniel Elazar. Weber, of course, famous-
ly identified three types of legitimate authority: traditional, legal-rational, 
and charismatic (Weber 1978). These describe different ways in which 
subjects can experience exercises of power as appropriate and right 
rather than as arbitrary force. For our purposes, these types of legitimacy 
describe standards by which members of a scene experience their cultural 
participation as a valuable and appropriate use of their time and energy 
rather than wasteful, radical, sinful, or boring. 
We have supplemented Weber’s categories on two fronts. First, we 
have replaced his legal-rational category (where legitimate authority is 
based on the formal structure of laws) with two categories: utilitarian-
ism and expressivity. We do so, following Robert Bellah, because modern 
American individualism is more complicated than Weber’s typology can 
capture. Many individuals make their judgments based on standards 
of efficiency and rationality, but many others seek opportunities for 
creative expression (Bellah 1996). Secondly, following Daniel Elazar, we 
include egalitarianism in order to capture the power of the strands of 
New England moralism running through so much of American culture 
(Elazar 1975). A moral approach to culture fits cultural activity into the 
larger goal of creating a “city on a hill” where all humans are treated 
equally regardless of origins or heritage, the pursuit of private interests 
is viewed as corrupting, and creative expression is a dangerous luxury. 
There may, of course, by important gaps in this typology, but it does 
describe the dominant terms in which cultural life matters to 21st-century 
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Americans: as an expression of their heritage, their creativity, their char-
ismatic heroes, their righteousness, or their industriousness. 
7. CONCLUSION: BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE
From 1970s, a NPC emerged in developed countries, and with it broader 
political repertoires. With globalization, this trend intensified and culture 
rose in salience. Scenes are a new sensitive way to capture the rise of 
culture, since they stress culture’s’ multifaceted dimensions without fall-
ing into a postmodernist view that cultural outlooks are near-unique to 
each individual. Discussion, especially by social scientists, has been too 
much dominated by the Tocqueville–Putnam approach. It is not wrong, 
but incomplete, especially in areas of the world with weak exposure to 
the Northwest European Protestant traditions of individualistic democ-
racy. This paper proposes a set of concepts and some core propositions 
about alternative mechanisms which may successfully engage citizens 
with their political systems — in addition to voting and civic participa-
tion, as stressed by the Tocqueville–Putnam tradition. Charisma and indi-
vidualistic self-expression are two resources, as well as two dimensions 
of legitimacy, which political leaders around the world have employed 
with considerable success to attain their political goals. Take the example 
of the arts and entertainment as new major areas of especially “local” 
policy making. The individual fruition of amenities, mega-cultural events, 
etc. is a powerful and significant civic engagement, as an alternative to 
participation in the local neighbors association. 
To value the latter over the former, as suggested by most of litera-
ture is to miss what is perhaps the single most important social change 
currently taking place — the shift from a class-based style of politics to 
an issue-based, individualistic and consumption-oriented mode of citizen-
ship. There is a new kid in town and he is not joining the local Kiwanis 
Club or Boy Scouts. He seldom votes. But he goes to large concerts, 
enjoys certain sports events as participant and spectator, hangs out at 
locations he finds attractive in his leisure time, and has a distinctive set 
of friends. Sensitive civic and political organizers, those who work in 
the streets with new social movements and new forms of activism, do 
not waste time lamenting the past but seek to engage these new scenes. 
In the years to come, as the media and more fluid arrangements like 
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scenes grow more visible and more thoroughly documented, even social 
scientists may come to accept that race, class and gender are not suffi-
cient drivers to join and to vote, and that joining and voting are not the 
only mechanisms that build legitimacy, trust, and an workable political 
system.
NOTES
 1. The Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) Project, which covers surveys 
of local governments in 35 countries, has been studying throughout the world 
the evolution of this value shift. This chapter is a product of this collaborative 
effort. Thanks to Meghan Kallman for editorial assistance.
 2. Materials include Terry Nichols Clark paper on Bogotá book on Chicago, and 
New Political Culture in eight books, Eleonora Pasotti’s draft book on Bogotá, 
Naples, and Chicago; Federico Perez case study of Bogota; Clemente Navarro 
and associates work on the New Political Culture in Mexico, Spain, and Latin 
America, esp. introduction to Spanish Edition of NPC book. See www.faui.org 
for an overview.
 3. Walle (2007) maintains that such prebendal clientelism dominates Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
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